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Article 5

Book Reviews
De Roo, Neal. Futurity in Phenomenology: Promise and Method in Husserl, Levinas, and Derrida. Fordham
University Press, 2013. xvii + 212 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8232-4464-5. Reviewed by Aron Reppmann, Professor
of Philosophy and Director of New Faculty Formation, Trinity Christian College, Palos Heights, Illinois.
The phenomenological approach in philosophy, which
originated with the work of Edmund Husserl (18591938), is characterized by its resistance toward any
attempt at reducing the complexity of human experience in the world—philosophical reductions that
stress either human subjectivity or the objectivity
of the world as the ultimate root of our experience.
Phenomonology’s commitment to honoring the irreducible complexity of experience is already evident
in what is often considered to be its basic structural
insight, namely the “intentionality of consciousness.”
Intentionality is the idea that consciousness is always
consciousness-of something, and, conversely, that anything is only experienced or encountered in its manifestation for-consciousness. Doing justice to the reality
of experience, according to phenomenology, means
not imposing a linear logic on it, but rather remaining
attentive to the constitutive, ongoing interplay that is
always at work within it.
In this book, Neal De Roo traces another instance
of phenomenology’s predilection for complex relations
and inherent tensions, namely the significance of futurity, the way in which our experience of time is both
anticipatory and undetermined because it is inherently open to the future, to what is to come. Although
phenomenologists, beginning with Husserl himself,
have offered analyses of time-consciousness (the interrelation of past, present, and future in our experience
of time) as integral to consciousness as such, De Roo
contends that “the true centrality of the future to the
project of phenomenology has not yet been elaborated” (1). He argues, in fact, that intentionality and futurity are intrinsically linked: “The phenomenological
claim of intentionality—that the constituting subject
must be necessarily ‘open’ beyond itself and its own
horizons—emerges only when futurity is considered
essential to phenomenology” (3). The promise of this
book is that it will treat a selection of authors and texts
that are well-known to those familiar with phenomenology, but from a standpoint whose importance has
previously been neglected. In doing so, De Roo hopes
to unify the phenomenological project—to heal some
of its internal dissensions—but not, of course, to sim-

ply resolve them, since a drive toward simple resolution would contradict phenomenology’s commitment
to honoring inherent complexities.
De Roo’s expressed intention in this book is to be
neither an historian nor a practitioner of phenomenology, but a sort of mechanic of phenomenology (this is
my image, not his). He focuses on the structural commitments of phenomenological method and uses those
structural insights to diagnose particular problems and
to suggest possible repairs. He contends that attending to the different ways in which futurity functions in
phenomenology will “show us something important
about phenomenology and its operation” (6) and offers the promise of “build[ing] a bridge over the chasm
that has developed between Husserlian phenomenology, on the one hand, and ‘theological’ phenomenology on the other” (2).
Even as he focuses structurally rather than historically, De Roo is a master storyteller. His treatments
of the three philosophers on which the book focuses—Husserl, Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), and
Jacques Derrida (1930-2004)—are staged as an unfolding conceptual narrative, such that the possibilities and problems in Husserl’s analyses of futurity lead
directly to Levinas, and the possibilities and problems
in Levinas’ analyses of futurity in turn lead directly to
Derrida.
Part I, “Futurity in the constitution of transcendental subjectivity,” offers a sustained encounter with
Husserl, exploring three different modes of futurity in
Husserl’s work—protention, expectation, and anticipation. These three modes correspond to three different levels of consciousness, ranging from the “absolute” and universal operation of consciousness-as-such
to the particularities of an individual’s consciousness.
Throughout Part I, De Roo demonstrates his impressive ability as a mechanic of phenomenology. In chapter 1 he reaches beyond the limitations of Husserl’s
classic book on time-consciousness (The Internal
Consciousness of Time), in which futurity is given short
shrift as merely a kind of inverse of retention, to lesserknown, later writings that recognize a more distinctive
and truly futural role for protention. In chapter 2 he
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painstakingly establishes the three-level approach to
organizing Husserl’s understanding of futurity, which
Husserl does not explicitly present as such but which,
as De Roo demonstrates, makes good and clarifying
sense of Husserl’s various writings on this subject.
In chapter 3, De Roo “[goes] beyond the letter of
Husserl’s texts” to round out the portrait of futurity’s
role in time-consciousness with an account of what we
as particular subjects do in the “active directing of the
egoic regard,” which he calls “anticipation” (6).
For all his fine-grained analysis and appreciation
of Husserl’s treatments of futurity, De Roo ultimately
finds those treatments limited by Husserl’s tendency to
treat time-consciousness primarily as an epistemological concern. Anticipating the ways in which Levinas
and Derrida will re-found phenomenology in ethical
and religious attunement, De Roo in chapter 3 begins to turn the analysis in that direction, particularly
through his examination of an essay on hope by James
K.A. Smith and through the anticipatory structure of
making and accepting promises. This sets the stage for
Part II, “Futurity and the ‘openness’ of the intentional
subject,” where the focus is on Levinas.
Where Part I introduced the inherent tension
involved in a phenomenological account of futurity,
Part II explores that tension by asking how this account affects the nature of subjectivity itself. Husserl
emphasizes the way in which consciousness constitutes
the world, while Levinas emphasizes the way in which
consciousness is receptive of the world. Levinas’ strikingly different approach “posit[s] ethics, not ontology
or epistemology, as first philosophy.” De Roo argues
that Levinas’ different starting-point “does not go beyond phenomenology so much as it moves within a
broadly Husserlian phenomenology against a conception of phenomenology that would unduly narrow its
scope” (7).
In Part II, De Roo traces Levinas’ critical appropriation of Husserl, demonstrating in chapter 5 that
Levinas’ vision of the self as constituted by the other
gives a special role both to the irretrievable past (what
overcame me before I could ever take initiative) and
to the future (which is inherently open and surprising, out of my control or ability to reliably predict).
De Roo concludes that “[s]ubjectivity itself, then, is
futural for Levinas” in a far more profound and inherently destabilizing way than it was for Husserl (85).
But then in chapter 6, De Roo anticipates his later
focus on Derrida by introducing the Derridean idea
of “promise” as a concretization of futurity in responsibility for other people. With this, he indicates that
Levinas’ own account of futurity does not turn explic-
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itly in this direction.
This key turning-point in the book is likely to be a
point of contention between partisans of Levinas and
those of Derrida. Those whose sympathies lie more
with Derrida are likely to contend (as De Roo does)
that Levinas has missed something that must not be
avoided, while those whose sympathies lie more with
Levinas are likely to wonder (as I do) whether his
thinking is being subjected to a conception of “ethics” that misconstrues the significance of his work.
This way of “saving” Levinas’ insights may be viewed
as something more of a betrayal (94-95).
Part III, “Futurity and intentionality—the promise of relationship,” further explores a phenomenological account of futurity in its focus on Derrida. Derrida
serves De Roo well for this exploration. A consistent
motif here is the articulation of multiple inherenttension dualities, and “double necessity” is one of De
Roo’s favorite conceptual devices—sometimes even
multiple, mutually entailing double necessities, as
when he outlines a “pair of essential dualities” (132).
Chapter 7 shows how, like Levinas, Derrida finds an
inherent tension built into the structure of phenomenology. But this tension—indicated by the Derridean
term différance (“differing” as an always-ongoing, restlessly oscillating process of “deferring”)—does not
decide for either Husserl’s or Levinas’ version of phenomenological futurity. Instead, it holds onto both of
them in “a ‘unity’ that preserves the difference of each
pole in tension with each other” (8).
Here the idea of “promise” comes back in full
force as the “central aspect” of Derrida’s understanding
of futurity, which is named “the messianic.” As with
Levinas, futurity or openness is not something subsequent to the subject but is what has constituted the
subject itself. For Derrida “this promise is not made to
us, but is us: We are promised by the other, and it is
our responsibility . . . to respond to a call or promise
that, in a certain sense, was made before we were on
the scene” (127). De Roo argues that, for Derrida, the
promise “is the very structure of the future” (128).
In chapter 9, the final expository portion of the
book, De Roo secures the centrality of the theme of
futurity for the phenomenological enterprise by indicating some important limits to or restrictions on
what he has offered in the preceding couple of chapters. Here his account of the promise seems somewhat
more Levinasian in tone, in the sense of emphasizing
that the “ethics” on offer here is not oriented to the
particular concerns with applying principles for good
action (a commonplace conception of ethics), but
rather is a highlighting of the “anticipatory aspect” to

every subjective act (139).
De Roo’s concluding chapter, “The promissory
discipline,” takes final stock of what he has achieved
in the book. He carefully and convincingly points out
the ways in which his identification and amplification of futurity as central to phenomenology “opens
phenomenology to a set of problems and questions
that otherwise might seem to fall outside its scope.”
In terms of my earlier description, De Roo’s insightful care as a “mechanic” of phenomenology especially
shines in this concluding account. These final pages
open the exciting prospect of broad cultural relevance
for the work he has offered.
De Roo suggests that his interpretation of phenomenology as essentially promissory can open up
“the claims of the various sciences” to see the ways in
which they are “united together in the lives of individual people, who live in and as the promise of their
respective traditions,” as well as the ways in which
“communities and institutions, and not just individuals, are called to live in, as, and up to the promise”
(152). His closing assertion that “the phenomenological project is not only communal and intersubjective
in its method…but also in its application and scope”
makes this reader eager for the sequel in which these
tantalizing suggestions could be developed more fully
(152). I would expect, given the prominence in these
closing remarks of references to “community” and
“tradition,” that this subsequent work would offer a
more sustained dialogue with the hermeneutical wing
of phenomenology represented by Martin Heidegger
and Hans-Georg Gadamer, whom De Roo mentions
occasionally but did not have the space to treat at
length.
Most readers of Pro Rege are likely to note with
interest that Neal De Roo is a current faculty member

at Dordt College. Readers of De Roo’s book who are
familiar with the Reformational Christian philosophical tradition, which has exercised a profound shaping
effect on Dordt’s history, may want to keep that tradition in mind as they read his account of phenomenology’s commitment to honoring the complexities and
inherent tensions of human experience. Reformational
philosophy, which was initiated by Dirk Vollenhoven
and Herman Dooyeweerd at roughly the same time as
Husserl was establishing phenomenology, is similarly
committed to an anti-reductionist approach to complexity. While De Roo does not explicitly address the
Reformational tradition, he does provide ample material for readers interested in considering the affinity
between this tradition and phenomonology.
This is not a book for beginners, at least not beginners reading on their own. Phenomenology is
intricate in its conceptuality, its terminology, and its
controversies, and De Roo dives right in to the midst
of it, assuming his readers’ expertise and offering few
handholds for those who do not already possess that
expertise. That said, his voice is lively throughout, and
his cheerful good humor winks out persistently. In the
hands of a skilled teacher, this book would serve very
well as a thematic centering text for a graduate or upper-level undergraduate seminar on phenomenology.
The tight structure of the book’s contents, along with
its abundant endnotes (37 pages of small type), generous bibliography (13 pages), and carefully prepared
index, would provide ample resources for students and
professor to navigate both through and beyond the
text. If Neal De Roo himself were to offer such a course
as a seminar for colleagues in the discipline—such as
a National Endowment for the Humanities summer
seminar—I would be the first in line to sign up.

Klay, Phil. Redeployment. New York: Penguin, 2014. 304 pages, paperback. ISBN: 978-1-5942-0499-5.
Reviewed by James C. Schaap, Emeritus Professor of English, Dordt College, Sioux Center, IA.
War stories usually take on the motif of initiation
because no one, thank goodness, is ever prepared for
watching friends—buddies—die and die fitfully; war
stories are always about men and women whose lives
and visions are changed by warfare, changed forever.
Experiencing the horror of war leaves those who
are changed with memories as sharp as cut glass,
stories you either tell or you do not. Many do not,
but not talking about one’s experiences often means
those stories create a din within the echo chamber
that one’s mind and heart becomes. PTSD can result—at least that’s the common wisdom.

The stories Phil Klay tells in Redeployment, a riveting collection of tales dug out of the recent Iraq
War are not so much about not telling war stories.
They’re not about what veterans suffer for their silence. What Klay does so poignantly is explore the
heartache one feels in telling them.
All vets, I suppose, are achingly conscious of the
stories they have and can tell because they discover that some people really do want to know them,
for reasons that are both noble and ignoble, for
everything from soulful empathy to sick entertainment. Many do want to know.
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